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Skill and motor control: Intelligence all the way down 
Ellen Fridland 
King’s College London 
Forthcoming: Philosophical Studies 
Abstract:  
When reflecting on the nature of skilled action, it is easy to fall into familiar 
dichotomies such that one construes the flexibility and intelligence of skill at the level 
of intentional states while characterizing the automatic motor processes that 
constitute motor skill execution as learned but fixed, invariant, bottom-up, brute-
causal responses.  In this essay, I will argue that this picture of skilled, automatic, 
motor processes is overly simplistic. Specifically, I will argue that an adequate 
account of the learned motor routines that constitute embodied skills cannot be given 
in a purely bottom-up, brute-causal fashion. Rather, motor control is intelligent all 
the way down. 
 
To establish this, I will first review two recent accounts of skill, Stanley and Krakauer 
(2013) and Papineau (2013), which characterize the automatic motor control 
responsible for the fine-grained movements constitutive of motor skill as brute, low-
level phenomena. I will then isolate five key features that should apply to skilled 
motor control, if these accounts are correct. Together, the accounts posit that motor 
control is: 1. Ballistic, 2. Invariant, 3. Independent of general action trajectories, 4. 
Insensitive to semantic content, and 5. Independent of personal-level intentions. In the 
final section of this paper, I will appeal to optimal control theory for empirical 
evidence to challenge the commitment to skilled action as qualified by the above 
features.  
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When reflecting on the nature of skilled bodily action, it is easy to fall into familiar 
dichotomies such that one construes the flexibility and intelligence of skill1 at the 
                                                        
1 In the course of this paper, when I use the word “skill” I will be referring exclusively to skilled 
bodily actions. I will not take a stance on whether any subpersonal processes, whether perceptual or 
motor, are properly classified as skills and though I think that a theory of bodily skill will have 
level of intentional states while characterizing the automatic motor processes that 
constitute motor skill execution as learned but fixed, invariant, bottom-up, brute-
causal responses.  In this essay, I will argue that this picture of skilled, automatic, 
bodily action is overly simplistic. Specifically, I will argue that an adequate account 
of the learned motor routines that constitute embodied skills cannot be given in a 
purely bottom-up, brute-causal fashion. Rather, the motor control involved in 
skilled action is intelligent all the way down.  
To establish this, I will first review two recent accounts of skill, Stanley and 
Krakauer (2013) and Papineau (2013), which characterize the automatic motor 
control responsible for the fine-grained movements constitutive of motor skill as 
brute, low-level phenomena. I will then isolate five key features that should apply 
to skilled motor control, if these accounts are correct. Together, the accounts posit 
that motor control is: 1. Ballistic, 2. Invariant, 3. Independent of general action 
trajectories, 4. Insensitive to semantic content, and 5. Independent of personal-
level intentions. In the final section of this paper, I will appeal to optimal control 
theory for empirical evidence to challenge the commitment to skilled action as 
qualified by the above features. 
1. Skill: Cognitive Thought Plus Motor Reflex 
Though contemporary philosophical accounts of motor skill are rare, in those that 
have been forwarded recently it is easy to isolate a clear trend. The trend is to 
construe motor skill as a hybrid phenomenon composed of a cognitive component 
and a motor component. The cognitive component is usually cashed out in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                   
various interesting implications for our understanding of cognitive skill, I will remain silent on those 
implications here.  
propositional knowledge or intentional states and the motor component is 
construed in terms of automatic, low-level, causal processes, which are acquired 
through brute repetition.2  A hybrid account of skill is offered by Jason Stanley and 
Jonathan Krakauer (2013; from hereon S&K) and David Papineau (2013).3 
1a. Stanley and Krakauer on Skill 
On the S&K view, motor skills are composed of two components: propositional 
knowledge and what they call, following Schmuelof et al. (2012), “motor acuity”.  
For S &K, “manifesting any kind of knowledge, and any kind of skill, requires 
possession of both [perceptual and motor acuity and propositional knowledge]” (p. 
16).  In line with the Intellectualist account presented in Stanley and Williamson 
(2001) and Stanley (2011a, 2011b), the propositional knowledge that a skilled 
agent possesses is entirely responsible for the intelligence or cognition involved in 
skill.  That is, the Intellectualist is not committed to the idea that only propositional 
knowledge contributes to skillful activity but he is committed to the fact that no 
other aspect of skill will require explanation in cognitive, epistemic, semantic, or 
conceptual terms. 
According to Stanley’s Intellectualist account of know how, if an individual 
has a skill, 4 what that person knows is a proposition no different from the 
proposition that she might know when she knows that, knows who, knows where, 
knows what, or knows why. So, if Hannah knows how to ride a bike, that is, if she has 
the skill of bike riding, then what Hannah really knows is the answer to the 
                                                        
2 For a notable exception, see Levy (forthcoming) where he forwards a hybrid account where 
intelligence characterizes both personal-level intentional states and motor representations.  
3 Such an account is also gestured at by Wu (2013). 
4 For Stanley, knowing how is equivalent to having a skill. 
question, ‘‘what is the way for you to ride a bike?’’ That is, in a particular context c, 
we can say that Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle, ‘‘if and only if there is some 
contextually relevant way w such that Hannah stands in the knowledge relation to 
the Russellian proposition that w is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle and Hannah 
represents w under a practical mode of presentation’’ (Stanley and Williamson 
2001, p. 430).  In short, S knows that w is the way to 𝜑, where the way to 𝜑 is 
represented as a Russellian proposition, and S considers that w is the way to 
𝜑 under a practical mode of presentation. According to the Intellectualist, knowing 
that w is a way to 𝜑 is constitutive of know how or the cognitive aspect of skillful 
action. 
It’s important to note that there remains an open question about how finely 
or coarsely to individuate the proposition that Hannah knows and, hence, to what 
extent that proposition can account for the particular detailed movements manifest 
in Hannah’s bike riding on a particular occasion.5 In Stanley (2011b), it appears 
that propositions ought to be individuated somewhat finely such that individuals 
who possess different levels of skill will know different propositions.  As such, if 
Mira knows how to dunk a basketball better than Rohan, then Mira and Rohan do 
not know the same proposition. Likewise, as Stanley explains, when we say that 
John plays Chopin better than Mary, ‘‘[w]e are comparing the way in which John 
knows how to play Chopin to the way in which Mary knows how to play Chopin, 
and declaring the first superior to the second’’ (2011b, p. 50).  
                                                        
5 See Fridland (2013) for a discussion of problems associated with individuating propositions either 
in a coarse or fine-grained way. 
Nonetheless, on Stanley’s account, the proposition that an individual knows 
will not be individuated so finely that it will be able account for the specific detailed 
movements involved in performing an action in a particular situation, at a 
particular time, in response to specific situational cues, etc.6 Presumably, these 
detailed movements make a significant contribution to both the success and 
expertise of a skill7 but, on Stanley’s view, they are accounted for not in terms of the 
propositions that a skilled agent knows but in terms of motor acuity.  This 
interpretation of the Intellectualist account is justified since, as I’ve argued 
previously (2014): 
[N]either Stanley and Williamson (2001), Stanley (2011a, 2011b)  
nor S&K give any indication of how it is that propositional knowledge could 
be responsible for the fine-grained, detailed motor control that is developed through 
practice and training and expressed in the execution of skilled actions. S&K spend a lot of 
time discussing the propositions required for acting intentionally, but they do not even 
gesture towards an explanation of how knowing various propositions will govern the 
execution or implementation of those propositions in a nuanced, detailed, particular, 
controlled way. 
 
Both because they ignore an account of how control could be guided by knowledge of 
propositions, and because they focus on the role of motor acuity in accounting for the fine-
grained movements of motor skill, it seems reasonable to attribute to S&K the view that 
control is simply a matter of motor acuity. That is, since it is only in reference to motor 
acuity that any mention of fine-grained control is made, I can only assume that it is motor 
acuity that is supposed to account for the particular, detailed, nuanced, fine-grained control 
manifest in motor skills (p.2739). 
 
As such, we can assume on the Intellectualist account, motor acuity is 
responsible for the fine-grained details8 involved in the execution of skilled actions.  
                                                        
6 It is possible to cash out propositions in a more fine-grained fashion such that every variation in 
movement execution is mirrored by an improvement in propositional knowledge. This is the view 
forwarded by Pavese (2013). However, on the S&K view, the fine-grained, kinematic details of 
motor skill execution are not cashed out in terms of propositional knowledge but rather in terms of 
motor acuity.   
7 See Fridland (2014) for an illustration of the importance of fine-grained motor control in giving an 
adequate account of skill.  
8 When I use “fine-grained”, I have in mind both the parameters and time-scale of movement. As 
such, fine-grained movements are evident in both the millimeter and microsecond adjustments that 
are characteristic of skilled action. 
Moreover, though motor acuity is necessary for the successful instantiation of a 
skilled action, it’s important to notice that motor acuity is not knowledge involving 
or intelligent.  Motor acuity, according to S&K, is simply the analogue of perceptual 
acuity:9 a process that can undergo improvements as a result of experience but 
which is neither the result of attentive practice nor is it under voluntary control. 10 
According to S&K, the problem with much philosophy and cognitive science is that 
“motor skills have been incorrectly identified with the part of skill that is not 
knowledge” (p. 15).  That is, motor skills have been identified with procedural 
knowledge but, according to S&K, procedural knowledge is not knowledge at all. It 
is just motor acuity: a causal, subpersonal, phenomenon of motor mechanisms 
tuning up in a strictly bottom-up manner.  In short, for S&K, skill combines 
intelligent guidance by propositional knowledge with the noncognitive, basic, 
subpersonal, low-level motor and perceptual abilities. The propositional bit of skill 
is knowledge involving while the motor acuity bit is not. 
 For my purposes, the relevant aspect of S&K’s hybrid theory that is worth 
questioning is their construal of motor acuity.  That is, it is worth investigating the 
truth of S&K’s claim that motor acuity is a more or less bottom-up, brute-causal 
process that does not require epistemic, cognitive, semantic, personal-level, or 
agentive explanations. In the following, I will consider evidence, which indicates 
that such a simple, causal account of the detailed kinematics of automatic motor 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
9 S & K write that “motor skills have an acuity component that is directly analogous to perceptual 
acuity” (p. 16). 
10 As S & K write, “Shmuelof et al. have recently coined the term “motor acuity” to describe the 
practice related reductions in movement variability and increases in movement smoothness….Such 
adaptions are not the acquisition of something that is characteristically manifest in intentional 
action, i.e., they are not the acquisition of skills” (p. 15). 
processes both oversimplifies and mischaracterizes the nature of the motor 
phenomena involved in skilled action.   
1b. Papineau on Sporting Skill 
In a similar spirit, Papineau argues that there are three reasons for thinking that 
the automatic motor processes that unfold during sporting skill are not guided by 
conscious control11 and, thus, are reflex-like.  First, there is the speed at which 
many sporting skills are executed—a speed that makes it practically impossible for 
the slow, deliberate, conscious system to be involved in their implementation 
(Papineau 2013, p.178). Second, there is the fact that the unconscious dorsal 
stream and not the conscious ventral stream has been shown to be responsible for 
the online visual control of overlearned movements, such as reaching and grasping 
(Milner & Goodale 2006, 2010).  Accordingly, Papineau argues that it is much more 
likely that the unconscious dorsal stream facilitates successful motor skill 
execution rather than conscious, personal-level, ventral stream processes. Thirdly, 
Papineau appeals to the fact that, at least sometimes, conscious thought interferes 
with the smooth and easy flow of motor skill (Beilock and Carr 2001, Beilock, et al. 
2002, Beilock 2007, 2010).  For these reasons, Papineau concludes that the motor 
processes executed in sporting skill are not cognitive or conscious phenomena but, 
rather, largely a matter of reflex.12  He writes:  
We have seen ample reason to think that top-level batting is more like an 
automatic reflex than any consciously controlled sequence of movements. 
The basic facts of timing, plus the evidence rehearsed in the last three 
                                                        
11 It seems safe to assume that for Papineau, “conscious” does not just mean “phenomenal” or 
“experienced” but something more like “an intentional, personal-level states that one is a aware of 
being in.” 
12 For a response to the claim that these considerations entail that skilled bodily actions are mostly 
non-conscious, see Shepherd (2015).  
sections, all argue that the execution of a specific shot in response to the 
bowler’s delivery is an automatic reaction honed by thousands of hours of 
previous practice (p.184). 
 
Papineau does not deny that conscious intentions can and do effect the execution of 
automatic, expert skills but he is clear that intentional states only impact automatic 
basic actions in an indirect way. According to Papineau, conscious intentions can 
set the parameters for the action-control system such that the right automatic 
motor routine is triggered in the appropriate situation.  The story he gives for how 
this might happen is the following:  
This phenomenon strongly suggests that long-term intentions do 
their work by adjusting the state of the basic action-control system. 
The formation of an implementation intention reconfigures this 
system so that it will trigger behaviour B when circumstance C is 
next encountered. After that the operation of the basic action-
control system can proceed in its normal automatic manner 
(p.190). 
 
When applied to sporting skill, the account looks like this: 
At any stage of an inning, a competent batsman will have assessed 
the situation and formed a view about how to bat—a conscious 
intention to adopt a certain strategy. As with any intention, this will 
then set the parameters of the basic action-control system. It will 
direct that system to bat aggressively, say.  It will take one raft of 
conditional dispositions from the batsman’s repertoire, and 
reconfigure that basic control system so that it embodies just those 
dispositions…Having been so reset, the basic action-control system 
will then respond accordingly, without any further intrusion of 
conscious thought” Emphasis in original, (2013, p. 191). 
 
For Papineau, what’s crucial is that the intention to bat in certain way, e.g., 
aggressively, selects a certain class of dispositions, i.e., aggressive batting 
dispositions, which will run automatically in response to the appropriate 
environmental stimuli. One can think of Papineau’s proposal in the following 
manner: strategic intentions initiate the selection of a relevant action folder, which 
contains a set of automatic motor routines that have been developed through 
practice, training, drilling, etc.  Once the folder is selected, the automatic motor 
routines within it run autonomously in a more or less fixed, reflex-like manner. 13 
 What’s clear from this picture is that if we want to identify a cognitive 
component of sporting skill, that component will be the conscious, personal-level 
strategic intentions that direct or set the parameters for the action-control system.  
The other phenomena involved in motor skill, i.e., automatic basic actions, are 
characterized not in semantic or cognitive terms but as learned but fixed reflexes. 
These automatic motor processes are not directly impacted by personal-level 
conscious intentions or knowledge but, rather, run autonomously in a bottom-up 
manner once they are primed by the action-control system and cued by the right 
situational features. In short, for Papineau, since conscious control is not involved 
in directing or guiding the fast automatic processes of motor skill instantiation, 
those processes need not be cashed out in higher-order, personal-level, conceptual 
or intentional terms.  
We should notice that to challenge Papineau’s position, it is not necessary to 
deny his claim that conscious processes do not guide or control the online 
execution of automatic motor routines directly. Rather, we need only question 
whether the automatic motor routines themselves are brute-causal or mechanistic 
                                                        
13 For a similar account of intentions organizing action in a top-down manner, by setting the 
parameters which prime or trigger automatic action execution, see Wu (2013). Wu writes, “We thus 
act intentionally. In playing the piano, the automaticity aimed for is that the 
specific notes played need not be represented in one’s intention. “Parameter specification” 
is automatic because no top-down modulation at the level of intention is required to 
specify the specific notes played, the ordering of fingering and so forth. Certainly, in 
learning that passage, one can act with a changing set of demonstrative intentions, say to 
play that note with these fingers, and this is attentionally demanding. One has to 
attentively focus on relevant notes or relevant keys. But once the piece is mastered, setting 
those parameters is automatic” (p.18-19). 
as a result of not being under the direct control of consciousness. That is, we can 
question the legitimacy of Papineau’s move from “not controlled by consciousness” 
to “reflex-like”. Specifically, we should ask if the lack of conscious involvement in 
the fine-grained execution of automatic motor routines entails that the automatic 
motor routines constitutive of motor skills are reflex-like or mechanistic in nature.  
I will first forward this more basic challenge to Papineau’s view and later 
demonstrate that, likely, Papineau is wrong even about conscious, personal-level 
intentional states not being directly involved in the online adjustments and 
modifications manifest in automatic motor skill execution. 
 
2. Motor Control, Motor Acuity, and Reflexes 
In this section, I will first consider the implications and commitments that follow 
from both S&K’s and Papineau’s hybrid accounts of skill. In doing so, I will highlight 
five features that ought to characterize motor control, if the hybrid accounts are 
correct. Together, these accounts predict that motor control is: 1. Ballistic, 2. 
Invariant, 3. Independent of general action trajectories, 4. Insensitive to semantic 
content, and 5. Independent of personal-level intentions. I take it that any hybrid 
view of skill where the intelligence of skill is cashed out in personal-level 
intentional states and the motor component is characterized as brute and 
automatic will be committed to some combination of these features. As such, it is 
significant that all of the below features fail to characterize skill.  
2.1 Implications of S&K’s Account  
There are three major implications of the S&K hybrid view of motor skill that can 
be challenged on the basis of current empirical evidence supporting optimal 
control theory. The first is a strict independence between propositional knowledge 
and motor acuity.  The second is that improvements in motor skill will yield a 
uniform reduction in movement variability, and the third is that motor acuity is 
insensitive to higher-order goals. 
 As I outlined above, a principle commitment of S&K’s view is that 
propositional knowledge and motor acuity are independent components of motor 
skill. If this view is correct, then it should be possible to identify, characterize, and 
account for the non-epistemic aspects of motor skill, i.e., motor acuity or what has 
often been referred to as procedural knowledge, in a way that is largely 
independent of propositional knowledge.  Specifically, we should be able to give a 
full account of motor acuity by citing only causal relations between it and 
propositional states.  
Since S&K follow Shmuelof et al. (2012) in their construal of motor acuity, it 
seems reasonable to assume that S&K take on board the core distinction forwarded 
by Shmuelof and colleagues between processes responsible for motor acuity and 
processes responsible for task success. As Shmuelof et al. write, “[m]otor skill can 
be assessed at the levels of task success and movement quality” (2012, p.578).  
They go on to “propose that motor skill acquisition can be characterized as a slow 
reduction in movement variability, which is distinct from faster model-based 
learning that reduces systematic error in adaptation paradigms” (2012, p. 578).  As 
we’ll see below, Shmuelof and colleagues identify the slow reduction of movement 
variability with motor acuity, which leaves the faster model-based learning to be 
cashed out in terms of propositional knowledge (presumably, alongside other more 
familiar kinds of skill-based propositional knowledge, like, e.g., knowing a way to 
initiate an action and knowledge of what one is doing).14   
This follows from the S&K account since S&K highlight only two components 
of skill: the propositional component and the motor one.  And since the motor 
component of skill is identified with motor acuity, we are forced to conclude that 
the representations responsible for task success in adaptation paradigms are 
propositional in nature. 15  Accordingly, for the purpose of this discussion, we can 
identify the fast, model-based improvements observed in skill learning as acquiring 
knowledge of a way to φ, or learning a more-or-less general, stable trajectory, 
strategy, or movement sequence with which to achieve task success under various 
circumstances.  This propositional knowledge, which is cashed out in terms of 
internal representations or forward models, should be responsible for an agent’s 
ability to compensate for perturbation or overcome systematic error in a variety of 
circumstances; that is, this propositional knowledge should be responsible for task 
success. 
In contrast to the propositional knowledge component of skill, Shmuelof and 
colleagues maintain that motor acuity is a matter of increasing skill by reducing the 
variability of the movements constitutive of motor tasks and, thus, increasing 
                                                        
14 This also seems like a reasonable interpretation of S&K, since Haith & Krakauer (2013) endorse a 
view where, following Korenberg & Ghahramani (2003), model-based motor learning can be 
construed as belief-like. 
15 Adaptation learning can be understood as follows: “In these paradigms, subjects experience a 
perturbation of their hand during reaching or pointing movements: lateral displacement by prisms, 
rotation of movement direction, or lateral forces applied by a robot arm. Specifically, these 
paradigms have focused on adaptation, a form of learning characterized by gradual improvement in 
performance in response to altered conditions.” (Mazzoni and Krakauer 2011, p.1) 
movement quality. In fact, motor acuity can improve even after task error has been 
reduced to zero.16 For Shmeuloff and colleagues, as motor acuity increases, the 
amount of variability in the trajectory of a skilled movement decreases.  From this 
it follows that if fine-grained motor execution can be accounted for in terms of 
motor acuity alone then, in learning, we should expect to see on overall, uniform 
reduction in the variability of the kinematic details of automatic movements 
comprising skilled actions. That is, once the way, trajectory, motor sequence, or 
strategy has been learned (i.e., that part of learning that is concerned with task 
success and is attributable to propositional knowledge) then when it comes to the 
execution of a motor skill, on the S&K view, one should observe a uniform 
reduction in movement variability.  
 Lastly, if S&K are right about motor acuity, then it is worth pointing out that 
the fine-grained execution of automatic motor routines should not be directly 
sensitive to the semantic content of higher-order, intentional, personal-level goals. 
This is because if motor acuity is construed as a low-level, non-knowledge-
involving, bottom-up, brute-causal process, and if motor acuity is responsible for 
the detailed kinematics of motor skill instantiations, then the detailed kinematics of 
motor skills should not have the ability to systematically respond to various 
conceptual, semantic, intentional and otherwise, higher-order cognitive, personal-
level contents of goal-directed representations.  This follows in a straightforward 
manner from the idea that brute-causal processes, like those involved in e.g., water 
                                                        
16 “Learning tasks of this type do not generally have a built-in limit of performance: there is no 
systematic error to reduce to zero, and final performance is different from baseline” (Shmuelof et al. 
2012, p. 579). 
running down hill, billiard balls colliding, or digestion, are the wrong kinds of states 
to integrate with or be sensitive to intentional content. In fact, this commitment is 
fundamental to the distinction between physiological or physical systems and 
psychological or semantic ones. That is, this distinction really just points to the 
difference between systems that need to be explained in semantic or epistemic 
terms versus those that can be accounted for in brute-causal ways.  At this point, it 
is important to note that in order for S&K’s distinction between motor acuity and 
propositional knowledge to work, they must endorse a view where low-level motor 
states like those involved in motor acuity are importantly and fundamentally unlike 
propositional knowledge when it comes to requiring cognitive, semantic or 
epistemic explanations.  If they do not commit to the robust distinction between 
brute-causal and semantic-psychological explanations, then their basic contrast 
between motor acuity and propositional knowledge will turn out to be rather 
pallid.  
 In the following section, I will demonstrate that all three of S&K’s 
predictions are challenged by optimal control theory. That is, there is evidence that 
the detailed movements constitutive of motor skills do not undergo a uniform 
reduction in variability but, rather, reduction in variability is relative to task-
relevant dimensions of movement execution. Second, the lack of correction for 
task-irrelevant dimensions of movements indicates that the detailed motor 
kinematics involved in skilled motor execution and the general trajectories 
responsible for task success are not in fact independent of one another. Specifically, 
the intelligent online correction of only task-relevant dimensions of movement is 
incompatible with a view that holds that trajectories are set by one system and 
then executed mechanically by another. Third, since task-relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions of movement are not pre-determined by an independent motor 
planning, trajectory-setting system, it is plausible that a sensitivity to personal-
level goals accounts for the motor control system’s capacity to differentiate task-
relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions of skilled movements.  
2.2 Implications of Papineau’s Account 
Though Papineau does not articulate which features he takes to be most relevant 
for characterizing motor skills as reflex-like, we can reasonably assume that the 
following four properties are likely central to any account of motor skills as reflex-
like: (1) reflexes are insensitive to the content of personal-level goal states.  So, as 
discussed above, though intentional states might set the parameters for triggering 
motor routines, the motor routines themselves should be internally unresponsive 
to the particular features of a task that are specified by the goal. That is, the task or 
end should be set in such a way that automatic basic actions can simply execute it, 
but not adjust or adapt in any way that would require or indicate an understanding 
of the goal.  And (2), the semantic insensitivity of reflex-like motor skills entails that 
strategic intentions and automatic basic actions are fundamentally independent of 
one another. That is, one should be able to produce a complete characterization of 
each without an account of the other. Specifically, one should be able to give a full 
account of automatic motor routines without any more than a causal appeal to 
intentional, personal-level states. Additionally, it seems safe to assume that an 
account that characterizes skills as reflex-like will likely be committed to the idea 
that (3) reflexes run in their entirety once they are triggered. That is, reflexes are 
difficult to intervene upon once they have begun. In this sense, reflexes are ballistic.  
And the last feature that appears relevant for classifying motor skills as reflexes is 
that (4) the instantiation or execution of an automatic basic action is more-or-less 
fixed or invariant. That is, we should expect very little flexibility or variability in the 
execution of a reflex—reflexes run the same way every time they are triggered. As 
such, if automatic motor routines are reflexes then they should likewise be 
invariant.  
 Features (1) and (2) follow directly from Papineau’s proposal concerning 
the structure of the basic action-control system and its relation to strategic 
intentions.  That is, Papineau is clear that he takes automatic basic actions not to be 
directly impacted by conscious intentions at the personal-level. This lack of direct 
interaction between automatic basic actions and strategic intentions entails that 
the two phenomena are categorically independent of one another even if intentions 
have an indirect impact on automatic processing via priming or parameter setting.  
As such, if Papineau is right then basic actions ought not to run in a way that 
reflects a responsiveness to semantic content, but, rather, the goal state ought to be 
set by strategic intentions and then executed by the basic-action system in a more 
or less brute fashion.  After all, that’s the way reflexes run—they are independent 
of and sometimes even contrary to personal-level goals.   
 The feature of ballisticity also seems to be a plausible characteristic of motor 
routines if they are construed as reflexes.  A “process is ballistic, just in case when 
the processor starts it cannot be stopped by any endogenous means.”  
(Mandelbaum, 2014). Though, Papineau does not explicitly endorse or highlight 
this feature of automatic basic actions, it is presumably worth exploring whether 
the motor processes involved in sporting skill run in a ballistic fashion. After all, it 
would seem that paradigmatic cases of reflexes, like the knee-jerk reflex (patellar 
reflex), blink reflex (corneal reflex), withdrawal reflex, or gag reflex, are all ballistic 
in this sense. That is, one cannot interrupt or inhibit the reflex once it has been 
triggered, even if, in some instances, the agent has some control as to whether or 
not the reflex is triggered in the first place. 17  Moreover, it is possible that sporting 
skills are ballistic, and that the hours upon hours of training and drilling required 
for achieving high-level expertise in a skill is partly a matter of creating the 
conditions under which a basic action will run to completion on its own, without 
the need for ongoing attention, monitoring or guidance. That is, it is possible that a 
large amount of training creates reflex-like motor routines that must run until 
completion once set in motion and it may be that this feature of basic actions is 
important for the automatization of motor skills.  
 Lastly, it would seem that a central, paradigmatic feature of reflexes is that 
they are inflexible, fixed, or invariant.  That is, reflexes seem to be the kinds of 
processes that run the same way any time they are activated. If there is variation, 
one would expect it to be in the magnitude of the response, but certainly, the reflex 
itself seems to be a pretty fixed sort of thing. As such, if automatic basic actions are 
reflexes then we should expect very little variability in the particular manner or 
                                                        
17 As Mandelbaum writes in describing ballisticity, “The proper input is not necessarily processed 
every time the input reaches the module, but once the processing starts, one cannot stunt it at will, 
either through top-down effort or via other roughly psychological means” (forthcoming, p. 6-7). 
fashion in which automatic motor routines are implemented on various occasions. 
That is, when basic actions are activated, we should observe more or less invariant 
kinematic patterns unfolding as a response. Moreover, it would seem that the more 
variation or flexibility evident in automatic basic actions the less they would 
resemble reflexes.   
 As it turns out, none of the features that ought be observed if Papineau’s 
hybrid view of sporting skill is correct are in fact observed in the automatic 
sensorimotor execution of goal-directed skills.  In the following section, I will go 
into some detail about why these predictions about basic actions turn out to be 
false by reviewing empirical results that support optimal control theory.   
3. Optimal Control Theory and Hybrid Views of Motor Skill  
In this section, I will appeal to optimal control theory (Todorov & Jordan 2002, Lui 
& Todorov 2007, Todorov 2004) to challenge the commitment to motor acuity as a 
reflex-like basic action.  I do not claim that optimal control theory is the only game 
in town, but as will become clear below, it is in a unique position to account for 
recent experimental evidence of intelligent kinematic variability in an elegant and 
straightforward fashion.   Though I focus specifically on S&K and Papineau’s 
accounts of motor skill, presumably, any hybrid view of skill will be committed to a 
combination of the features that their accounts forward as characteristic of skill.  As 
we saw above, together, S&K and Papineau’s hybrid theories of skill are committed 
to the following five features of automatic motor control: 
1. Ballisticity 
2. Invariance 
3. Independent of general trajectories 
4. Insensitivity to semantic content  
5. Independence from personal-level strategic intentions 
I will argue that none of these purported features of motor control apply to the 
automatic motor processes executed in motor skill instantiations. 
3.1. Ballisticity  
Though the motor processes involved in skill are automatic, it is an open question 
whether one ought to conclude from this that these processes, “once learned, are 
difficult to suppress, modify or ignore” (Shiffrin and Schneider 1977, p. 129).  In 
fact, it seems that the notion that automatic processes are uncontrolled or 
uncontrollable is very difficult to sustain, if one begins by thinking about 
automaticity from the perspective of high-level motor skills such as tennis, 
gymnastics, or rugby instead of from the perspective of, e.g., perceptual processing. 
That is, if we start with skill, I think we will quickly conclude that the more skilled 
an automatic motor routine the more controlled it should be as well. After all, as 
Logan writes,  
Skilled performers are usually able to control their 
performance better than unskilled performers, even though 
their performance is likely to be more automatic. That is why 
we prefer to fly with experienced pilots rather than novices, 
why we feel more comfortable with experienced dentists and 
surgeons than with beginners, and so on (1985, p. 385).  
 
Presumably, control should include the ability to inhibit a skilled action at 
will (the impacts of natural forces, such as gravity, notwithstanding). So, if control 
over high-level motor skills increases with expertise, then one should expect that 
an expert would be able to intervene, interfere, and inhibit an automatic motor 
process at almost any point in its unfolding. From this perspective, we should 
expect that, unlike reflexes or mandatory processes, the automatic motor routines 
that compose complex skills should not prove to be ballistic. 
 Empirically, this is what we find. Logan (1982) studied expert typists to 
determine whether expertise in typing, and the associated automaticity of expert 
typing routines, are difficult to inhibit once initiated.  That is, Logan set out to 
determine if the automatic routines constitutive of typing skill were ballistic. 
Contra the expectations of those who held that automatic processes were difficult 
to control,  
Logan (1982) found that expert typists could successfully and 
quickly interrupt typing midword when hearing a stop signal; this 
indicates that the presumed automatic behavior of typing was not 
ballistic at the level of the word. Moreover, additional analyses 
demonstrated that skill level, as indexed by words typed per minute, 
was not related to stopping latency (Logan, 1983). (Cohen and 
Poldrack 2008 p. 108). 
 
Hence, Logan concludes that the automatic motor processes that underlie skilled 
typing are both automatic and controlled.  
Cohen and Poldrack (2008) confirmed Logan’s (1982) result by training a 
group of novices on a serial reaction time task (SRT). The participants trained until 
appropriate motor responses to various stimuli became immune to dual-task 
interference, a widely accepted sign of automaticity (Posner and Snyder 1975, 
Logan 1979).  Cohen and Poldrack (2008) then tested the reaction time of 
participants when asked to inhibit their automatized responses.  They found that 
there was “no change in the concomitant ability to inhibit motor response” (2008, 
p.113). That is, the reaction time for inhibiting an automatized motor response did 
not increase as the task became automatized.  Cohen and Poldrack (2008) conclude 
that, “these results contradict the proposition that automaticity is associated with a 
loss of control or development of ballistic movements” (p. 113). In short, there is 
significant empirical evidence to suggest that the automatized basic action routines 
that constitute motor skills are not ballistic. 18 This is the first reason to doubt that 
the automatic motor processes constitutive of motor skills are reflex-like.    
3.2 Motor Control as Invariant 
3.2.1. Reflex-like invariance 
As we saw above, if the automatic motor routines comprising skilled actions are 
reflex-like, then we should expect them to be more or less invariant or fixed.  
However, this prediction does not square with the fact that, in general, “movements 
are inherently variable” (Haith & Krakauer 2013, p. 12). The fact is that motor skills 
exhibit a significant amount of variability when instantiated on different occasions.  
As Todorov and Jordan write, “an especially puzzling aspect of coordination is that 
behavioral goals are achieved reliably and repeatedly with movements rarely 
reproducible in their detail” (2002, p.1226). And they go on to say that,  
both the difficulty and the fascination of this problem [of 
motor control] lie in the apparent conflict between two 
fundamental properties of the motor system. 1: the ability to 
accomplish high-level goals reliably and repeatedly, versus 
variability on the level of movement details. (Todorov and 
Jordan 2002, p. 1226). 
 
And this goes not only for unpracticed movements but for expert skills, as well 
                                                        
18 Though, as Helen De Cruz has pointed out to me in personal communication, this evidence does 
not support the stronger claim that skilled agents are able to intervene upon or inhibit their actions 
more quickly than novices. It only supports the claim that skilled actions are not ballistic.  Further 
research is needed to support the, to my mind, plausible prediction that with expertise, inhibitory 
control over skilled action increases.  
(Bartlett (2007).  As Yarrow et al. (2009) report, “athletes fail to reproduce precise 
kinematic pattern when performing a particular sports-specific activity” (p.586-7).   
As such, we can conclude that in sporting skill, we do not see the development of 
rigid, fixed or invariant movements with increased expertise. As such, we have a 
second reason to doubt the proposal that the automatic basic actions constituting 
embodied skill performance are reflex-like.   
We should notice that the inherent variability of goal-directed movement 
seems to be the motor system’s optimal solution to its massively redundant 
structure. Though, intuitively, we might expect that the best way to achieve the 
same goal in similar circumstances is to execute the very same movements, it turns 
out that the structure of the motor system makes such invariant or reflex-like 
movements sub-optimal. In fact, the very opposite appears to be true: variability is 
the best way to take advantage of the degrees of freedom afforded by a largely 
redundant, noisy, motor system that can achieve any motor goal in a large variety 
of ways by modifying variables such as force, acceleration, angle or joint position 
during movement.19  Accordingly, we see that even in practiced sporting skills, the 
kinematic details of movements are not precisely repeated in fixed ways, but retain 
a fair amount of variability and flexibility.   
 In addition to the variability of automatic motor routines, we should also 
notice that flexibility should be guaranteed by an increase in expertise. As I 
                                                        
19 As Haith and Krakauer 2013 write, “far from viewing redundancy as a problem, 
redundancy should actually be regarded as a positive thing. It makes it easier to find solutions 
to a given task and allows goals to be achieved more flexibly and robustly. Redundancy, 
therefore, makes life easier for the motor system to develop adequate means of control and in 
general enables superior control strategies” (p. 9).  
emphasized above in relation to ballisticity, we should expect that as skill 
increases, so too does flexibility and control. In the context of the variability of 
skilled movement, we should expect flexibility to be manifest in the appropriate 
online modification of automatic basic actions.20  That is, the more skilled an agent, 
the more we should expect her to be able respond appropriately to unexpected 
circumstances and adjust her automatic movements appropriately, in flexible and 
controlled ways.21  After all, we should expect the expert to be able to modify and 
adjust her skilled motor executions in ways that a beginner is unable to.22   
Accordingly, the more skilled an agent, the less reflex-like her skilled, automatic, 
basic actions should be.  
However, if automatic basic actions become like reflexes through training 
then this sort of flexibility and control would be impossible.  In fact, a reasonable 
way to interpret Papineau’s claim about automatic basic actions is to think of them 
as feedforward, model-free, open-loop processes. Open-loop motor control 
processes are developed through trial and error reinforcement learning and, 
though cheap to acquire, remain unfortunately inflexible (Haith & Krakaeur 
2013b).  For instance, to change a learned open-loop motor routine, one needs to 
start from scratch; one cannot simply adjust various aspects of the process in 
response to relevant information about one’s body or one’s environment.  Further, 
                                                        
20 For similar claims cashed out in an account of the relationship between intentions and actions, 
see Shepherd (2014). 
21 As Haith and Krakauer point out, “there is no need to wait for a large perturbation to prompt an 
adjustment of one’s movement. Even small deviations from expected trajectories should prompt a 
flexible change in motor commands” (2013, p. 15).  
22 Recall that, as we saw above, overcoming perturbations in adaptation paradigms is attributable to 
model-based representations (i.e., internal forward models) and not to open-loop, model-free 
processes.  
as Todorov (2004) argues,  
[O]pen-loop optimization has two serious limitations. First, it 
implies that the neural processing in the mosaic of brain 
areas involved in online sensorimotor control does little 
more than play a prerecorded movement tape—which is 
highly unlikely. Second, it fails to model trial-to-trial 
variability” (p. 907-8).   
 
By drawing our attention to the inflexibility of open-loop processes, I don’t 
mean to insist that open-loop control is not involved in skilled actions in any way. 
Presumably, such simple reinforcement learning would be useful both for reducing 
the computational demands required for model-based motor control and for 
exploiting the multitude of instances that an expert has performed a given motor 
routine in practice.23  However, given that simple reinforcement learning is 
inflexible, motor skill instantiation would seem to require the ready possibility of 
overriding open-loop processes by other elements of the motor control system, 
which are themselves sensitive and responsive to various changing features of the 
environment, one’s body, and one’s goals. But again, this would mean that, in skill, 
even where open-loop control is involved, automatic motor processes are not 
reflex-like, fixed, or inflexible—that is, automatic basic actions are not simply a 
matter of appropriately triggered, model-free, open-loop motor control policies. 
3.2.2. Reduction in Variability 
If procedural knowledge is really just a matter of motor acuity, then, as expertise 
grows, we should expect to see an overall reduction in the variability of movements 
constitutive of motor skill. This is because motor acuity should not be sensitive to 
                                                        
23 For more on this, see Haith and Krakauer (2013b). 
the semantic content of goal states, which will specify and update which aspects of 
a movement are goal-relevant and which goal-irrelevant. However, this prediction 
is not born out by the empirical evidence.  The fact is that as motor control 
develops, it does not undergo a uniform reduction in variability but, rather, 
variability is reduced in task-relevant dimensions of movement more than in task-
irrelevant dimensions (Bernstein 1967, Cole and Abbs 1987, Scholz and Schoner 
1999, 2000, Domkin et al. 2002, Todorov and Jordan 2002, Nagangast 2009). 
 As Todorov and Jordan (2002) explain, 
trial-to-trial fluctuations in individual degrees of 
freedom are on average larger than fluctuations in task-
relevant movement parameters—motor variability is 
constrained to a redundant subspace (or ‘uncontrolled 
manifold’) rather than being suppressed altogether (p. 
1226). 
 
Reduced variability in task-relevant kinematic details but not in all dimensions of 
movement conforms to what is called the Minimum Intervention Principle (MIP).  
According to this principle, agents “only correct perturbations that interfere with 
the achievement of task goals. If a perturbation is irrelevant to the task, for 
instance, if your elbow is knocked during a reaching movement without affecting 
your hand position then there is no need to correct for it—jut maintain the new 
elbow posture during the rest of the movement” (Haith and Krakaeur 2013, p.16).  
When applied to motor skill, we see that contra the predictions of S&K, the 
automatic sensorimotor execution responsible for the fine-grained movements 
constitutive of motor skill do not undergo a uniform, undifferentiated, brute, 
reduction in variability. Rather, as Yarrow et al. (2009) explain, though movement 
variability undergoes a general reduction through practice, the reduction is not 
uniform among task relevant and task irrelevant dimensions. In fact,  “stabilization 
of movement is greater for those aspects of posture that contribute directly to 
desired outcome” (p. 586).  
From this it follows that in motor skill execution, the motor control system 
must be able to differentiate between those aspects of a movement that are 
relevant for task success and those, which are not.  But this means that the 
reduction in movement variability observed during motor skill learning cannot be 
the result of a brute, tuning-up process achieved through blind repetition. And this 
means that motor acuity alone cannot account for the fine-grained automatic motor 
processes that unfold in skilled action. This is because motor acuity predicts a 
uniform reduction in variability across all dimensions of movement; a reduction 
that is achieved in a non-semantically sophisticated way. But what we find 
empirically is a reduction in variability that is differentiated between task relevant 
and task irrelevant dimensions of skill. 
3.3 Trajectory and motor control are not independent 
The above results supporting optimal control theory also challenge the proposed 
independence of trajectory (knowing a way to φ) and sensorimotor execution 
predicted by S&K’s theory. The fact is that optimal control theory demonstrates 
that the detailed kinematic strategies executed in motor skills do not blindly 
implement some general, pre-planned trajectory but, rather, unfold in an intelligent 
way.  I will discuss two studies, which are particularly important for demonstrating 
that trajectory and detailed motor execution are not independent.   
First off, Lui and Todorov (2007) demonstrate “that corrections for target 
perturbations introduced late in a reaching movement are incomplete” (p.9354). 
Importantly, they are able to show not only that certain perturbations remain 
uncorrected but that these perturbations remain uncorrected because they are 
irrelevant for task success and not simply because there is no time to correct them. 
This finding supports the notion that fine-grained sensorimotor control is flexible 
insofar as corrections are made in an intelligent way—not simply to conform to a 
pre-determined trajectory, but in order to achieve one’s goal.  That is, if a 
correction is unnecessary for task-success, even if it was part of an original motor 
plan, after perturbation, it remains uncorrected.  
 The flexible nature of sensorimotor control is further confirmed by 
Diedrichsen (2007) who shows “that both feedback control and adaptation change 
optimally with task goals” (p.1675). In his study, Diedrichsen had  
participants reach with two hands to two 
separate spatial targets (two-cursor condition) or 
used the same bimanual movements to move a cursor 
presented at the spatial average location of the two 
hands to a single target (one-cursor condition) (p. 1675). 
 
In both the feedback control paradigm and adaptation task, Diedrichsen 
demonstrated that movements were corrected for and adapted to in a way that 
reflected task goals and not a fixed, pre-determined trajectory.  Diedrichsen 
showed that in the bimanual, two-cursor condition, only the movement of the hand 
that was required for achieving task success underwent adaptation and was 
corrected for.  The other hand, since it was irrelevant for task-success, was not 
modified.  In contrast, in the two hands, one-cursor condition, both hands were 
corrected for and adaptation occurred for both, as adjustment of both hands was 
necessary for achieving the goal.  This study supports the idea that motor control is 
sensitive to task goals both at the sensorimotor execution and adaption level.   
Together, these studies suggest that the detailed movements constitutive of 
motor tasks do not rigidly execute a determinate trajectory but change and adjust 
online in an optimal way to achieve task success.   As Todorov and Jordan (2002) 
explain, “the optimal strategy in the face of uncertainty is to allow variability in 
redundant (task-irrelevant) dimensions. This strategy does not enforce a desired 
trajectory, but uses feedback more intelligently, correcting only those deviations 
that interfere with task goals” (p. 1226).  
 We should notice that these results entail that action trajectory planning 
and execution are not independent.  This follows from the above results because if 
the trajectory were planned prior to and independent of motor execution, then 
corrections in execution should conform to the pre-planned trajectory. That is, the 
relevant and irrelevant dimensions of the movement would not be determined 
online by the motor execution system but, rather, fixed by the system responsible 
for planning and selecting the appropriate trajectory. Since we see that movements 
are not corrected in a rigid way so as to conform to an initially planned trajectory 
but are continuously adjusted in order to achieve success at a given task, we can 
conclude that, contra S&K’s prediction, propositional knowledge and motor acuity, 
or knowing the way to φ, and implementing the motor details in order to φ, are not 
independent phenomena.  As Todorov and Jordan argue,  
This body of evidence [supporting optimal control theory] is 
fundamentally incompatible, with models that enforce a strict 
separation between trajectory planning and trajectory execution. 
In such serial models, the planning stage resolves the redundancy 
inherent in the musculoskeletal system by replacing the behavioral 
goal (achievable via infinitely many trajectories) with a specific 
‘desired trajectory’. Accurate execution of the desired trajectory 
guarantees achievement of the goal, and can be implemented with 
relatively simple trajectory-tracking algorithms. Although this 
approach is computationally viable (and often used in engineering), 
the many observations of task-constrained variability and goal-
directed corrections indicate that online execution mechanisms are 
able to distinguish, and selectively enforce, the details that are 
crucial for goal achievement. This would be impossible if the 
behavioral goal were replaced with a specific trajectory (2002 p. 
1226).   
 
 In short, trajectory planning and motor execution are not independent of 
one another. Accordingly, we can reject S&K’s proposal that propositional 
knowledge, or that part of motor skill that is relevant for task success or trajectory 
planning, and motor acuity, that part of motor skill that is relevant for the quality of 
movements implementing a motor trajectory, are autonomous components of 
motor skill.   It seems that if we want to understand the fine-grained kinematic 
details that unfold during motor skill execution, we have to do so by doing justice to 
the intelligent ways in which the motor control system functions. That is, we will 
not understand motor skill, if we insist that the automatic movements that are 
constitutive of skills rely on brute-causal motor processes that are incapable of 
adjusting and responding to situational demands in appropriate flexible, 
semantically integrated, and controlled ways. 
3.4 Is motor control sensitive to semantic content?  
 The last question that we must ask then is this: if task-relevance and 
irrelevance is not determined prior to execution by an independent motor plan or 
trajectory, then how are those features determined?  It seems that the simplest and 
most straightforward answer is that the motor control system is able to 
differentiate between task-relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions of movement 
by having the capacity to respond directly and flexibly to task goals. Accordingly, 
and as optimal control theory holds, the ability to differentiate between task-
relevant and task-irrelevant details of a movement is accomplished by a 
sensorimotor control system that is directly sensitive to the semantic content of 
personal-level goals.  As Todorov (2004) describes, “At the heart of the framework 
is the relationship between high-level goals, and the real-time sensorimotor control 
strategies most suitable for accomplishing those goals” (p. 907).  
 On optimal control theory, it would follow that the motor control system 
that is responsible for executing the detailed kinematic strategies required for 
implementing person-level goals, like, e.g., reaching for a glass of water, writing a 
sentence on a blackboard, or doing a cartwheel, is itself sensitive to the content of 
intentional states.  That is, the motor control system is not simply executing some 
fixed strategy that has been pre-selected for it by the cognitive system but, rather, 
the motor control system differentiates what is and is not relevant for achieving 
task success by being directly responsive to higher-order, personal-level goals. As 
the goals or circumstances change, the sensorimotor system can make online 
adjustments in a flexible and intelligent manner, implementing control at various 
levels.24  
3.5 Independence of intentional states and motor control 
                                                        
24 For a preliminary account of how personal-level intentions and the motor representations 
involved in skilled motor routines might be related see Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2012).  For a 
response to their view, see Mylopoulos and Pacherie (forthcoming).  
Importantly, the semantic coherence between goal states and the motor 
control system that executes them makes holding a hybrid view where intentions 
are strictly independent of and only causally related to the triggering of 
appropriate motor routines in appropriate situations impossible to hold. That is, 
the best evidence we have indicates that fine-grained, automatic motor processes 
instantiated in motor skills are not simply causally connected to intentional states 
but, rather, continue to be semantically sensitive and responsive to personal-level 
goals throughout execution. It is because of this responsiveness to personal-level 
intentional states that we are able to adjust and correct movements en situ in an 
optimal way, differentiating between task-relevant and task-irrelevant movements 
and making adjustments appropriately along the way. But the integration of task 
goal and automatic motor control is anathema to a picture of motor skill that holds 
a strict functional dichotomy between intentions or plans on one level and motor 
execution on another.  
4. Conclusion  
 I hope that it has become clear that a hybrid view of skilled bodily action 
where the intelligence of skill is cashed out in propositional, intentional terms and 
motor control is characterized in bottom-up, brute-causal, unintelligent ways is 
unsustainable.   Instead of thinking of independent intentional states and automatic 
reflex-like basic actions or of independent action trajectories and the execution of 
those trajectories by processes of motor acuity, it seems that we must revise our 
view of skill in order to reflect findings, which show that even those processes 
responsible for the automatic, low-level, fine-grained sensorimotor executions of 
motor skills are sensitive to high-level goals.  
 This fact propels us directly into a challenge that has recently been coined, 
the “interface problem” by Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2012). That is, the fact that 
motor control shows ongoing sensitivity to semantic contents at the personal level 
requires us to produce an account of how it might be that personal-level, 
conceptual, intentional states with semantic contents communicate with motor 
representations that are likely subpersonal and coded in a non-propositional, non-
conceptual format.25 The kind of dynamic, online communication between 
intentional states and motor representations that optimal control theory suggests 
obtains entails that any solution to the interface problem must address not only 
how intentional states play a role in the appropriate selection of motor 
representations but how the two kinds of states become integrated in such a way 
that creates coherent, successful, continuous action despite our ever-changing 
goals and the ongoing perturbations of the environment.  In short, any satisfactory 
account of the interface problem must address not just how motor representations 
are triggered by intentions, but how motor representations are continuously 
connected to goal representations in a semantically coherent fashion throughout 
skill execution. We might call this the “dynamic interface problem” and despite 
recent efforts to solve the interface problem, a solution to this more ubiquitous 
challenge remains outstanding. 26 
                                                        
25 For arguments as to why these states should be thought of as representing information in 
different codes, see Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2012), Mylouplous and Pacherie (forthcoming), and Levy 
(forthcoming). 
26 See Mylopoulos and Pacherie (forthcoming) for convincing reasons why the Butterfill and 
Sinigaglia (2012) demonstrative solution to the interface problem is left wanting. However, the 
 All of these considerations point to the fact that an adequate account of skill 
will require a substantive account of control not only at the intentional and motor 
level, but also a robust theory of the integration between the two. Such an account 
might itself be considered to be an account of control, that is, such an account may 
provide us with a way of understanding the difference between more and less 
controlled actions.  As Josh Shepherd offers, we might construe control as a 
property of certain kinds of flexible and repeatable actions; actions where, under 
various circumstances, motor representations fulfill the intentions that guide them 
(2014). In this way, the more integration there is between intentional and motor 
states, the more controlled an action would be.  Accordingly, an answer to the 
dynamic interface problem may give us an account of controlled action, in general.  
As such, it would seem then that any adequate account of the control characteristic 
of skilled actions (control, a la Shepherd) will require substantive connections 
between control at the intentional and control at the motor level.  
 In short, like most dichotomies, the one’s that are proposed by hybrid views 
of motor skill turn out to be false. The motor control system is not simply a brute-
causal, bottom-up system that becomes tuned through simple repetition, and which 
is set or triggered by cognitive, intentional, personal-level states.  The control 
characteristic of skilled actions, as it turns out, is a lot more complicated than that. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
considerations above also put pressure on Mylopoulos and Pacherie (forthcoming) 
who have not quite given us a way to understand dynamic interfacing.  
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